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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a new rule for calculating the discount rate to
value risky projects. The rule works under any linear asset pricing
model and any equilibrium theory of debt and taxes. If securities are
priced by the standard capital asset pricing model, the discount rate
is a weighted average of the after-tax Treasury rate and the
expected rate of return on the market portfolio, where the weight on
the market portfolio is the project beta. We prove that this discount
rate gives the correct project value and explain why it works. We
also recast the rule in certainty equivalent form, restate it for
multifactor capital asset pricing or arbitrage pricing models, and
derive implications for the valuation of real options.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We still do not understand the role of taxes in determining
optimal capital structure, if there is an optimal capital structure.
Therefore, we have so far no general rule for calculating discount
rates for capital investments which are partly debt-financed. The
only bulletproof existing rules apply to two special cases. Risk-
free, after-tax nominal cash flows should be discounted the after-
tax risk-free interest rate. And projects that exactly duplicate the
firm's existing assets, both in risk and financing, are correctly
valued by discounting at the firm's weighted average cost of capital.
The discounting rules for these two special cases work
regardless of "right" theory of debt and taxes. For example, Ruback
(1986) shows that discounting safe, nominal cash flows at the
after-tax Treasury rate works when the benefits to leverage equal
the corporate tax shield, as in Modigliani and Miller (1963), when
personal taxes fully offset the corporate tax shield, as in Miller
(1977), and in intermediate cases. Ruback observes that any stream
of riskless future cash inflows can be offset by a borrowing plan
that exactly matches after-tax debt service to the cash inflows.
Since debt service is covered exactly, the initial amount borrowed
under the plan is the value of the stream. 1
We present a discounting rule which can be used to value any
risky cash flow stream under any linear asset pricing model and any
equilibrium theory of debt and taxes. The discounting rule works if
the corporation adheres to a specific financing policy for the project
or if the corporation can hold common stocks for its own account
without incurring significant taxes or transactions costs.
Our rule does not require exotic ingredients -- only the risk-
free interest rate, the marginal corporate tax rate, a risk measure
or measures for the cash flow stream, and the expected rate of
return on a reference portfolio of common stocks. If a one-factor
capital asset pricing model is assumed, as we do for convenience in
most of this paper, the risk measure is the asset beta and the
reference portfolio is the market portfolio. In that case, our rule is:
r* = rf(l - Tc)(1 - 3) + prm (1)
where r* is the discount rate; 2 rf(1 - Tc) is the nominal Treasury
rate, after taxes at the marginal corporate rate Tc; rm is the expected
rate of return on the market, and p is the project's asset beta, the
beta of a direct equity claim on the asset's cash flows.
The intuition for this rule is straightforward. The right
discount rate for a risky project is the expected rate of return on an
equivalent-risk capital market investment. A firm could invest in
Treasury (T) bills and the market portfolio to form a replicating
portfolio with the same risk as the project. The replicating
portfolio includes the fraction (1-P) invested in T-bills at an after-
corporate-tax return of rf(1 - Tc), and the fraction P invested in the
market at an expected return of rm. (We assume for now that
corporate investment in equities is untaxed.) The replicating
portfolio has the same beta as the risky project and provides an
after-corporate-tax return of r* as given by (1). That rate is the
firm's opportunity cost of capital for the project.
Our rule can also be interpreted as a project-specific, after-
tax, weighted average cost of capital (WACC):
WACC = rD(1-Tc) (DN) + rE (E/V) (2)
Here rD and rE are expected returns on debt and equity, D and E are
market values of debt and equity, with V = D + E. Our rule sets the
debt ratio, DN, equal to 1 - 3 and therefore E/V = P. With these
weights, if the debt is riskless (so that rD = rf), the equity has a
beta of one and rE = rm. Thus, our rule simplifies the weighted
average cost of capital approach in two ways. First, the debt and
equity weights are determined by the project's asset beta, and do
not require a judgment about debt capacity or optimal leverage.
Second, there is no need to estimate the costs of debt and equity for
the firm's own securities.
The information requirements for capital budgeting are
reduced in our rule to the practical minimum. We do not claim this
minimum is easy. The decision-maker cannot avoid judging or
estimating project risk and the expected return on some equity
security or portfolio.
Existing Theory and Practice
Taggart (1991) reviews and tabulates existing discount rate
formulas. These fall into two classes.
WAC.. The tax-adjusted weighted average cost of capital
shown in Eq. (2) appears in Modigliani and Miller (1963) and has a
long textbook tradition -- see, for example, Guthman and Dougall
(1962), Chapter 7. WACC is robust and general, but it is almost
always estimated for the firm as a whole, and thus applies only to
projects which match the firm in risk and financing. Our rule is a
project-specific WACC, where the weights, but not the "costs" of
debt and equity, depend on project risk.
Tax-Adjusted discount rates. These formulas start with the
project's opportunity cost of capital, that is the expected rate of
return that would be demanded on an unlevered equity claim on
project cash flows. This rate is then adjusted downwards to
account for the net value of interest tax shields on debt supported
by the project. The hard part is determining the net value of
interest tax shields and the slope of the security market line when
the relevant marginal personal tax rates are not observable.3 This
may explain why tax-adjusted discount rates are rarely used in
practice. Our rule avoids this problem because it uses rates of
return defined before personal income taxes.
Taggart's and our reviews of the literature uncover no direct
ancestors of our discounting rule. However, our idea of varying debt
ratios project-by-project to keep the sum of business and financial
risk constant is not new. Perhaps its earliest expression is in
Solomon (1963, pp. 76-78).
Outline
The next section of the paper offers two proofs of our
discounting rule. Section III explains more specifically why it
works. It turns out that the rule values projects as if firms face a
Miller "Debt and Taxes" equilibrium in which there is no net tax
advantage to borrowing -- yet the rule also works under MM's
"corrected" theory in which there is a strong tax advantage. This is
not as paradoxical as it sounds. Firms that borrow in an MM world of
course gain valuable interest tax shields However the slope of the
security market line is less than in a Miller world. These two
effects cancel.
Each of our initial proofs relies on special assumptions.
However, the rule is not tricky or fragile. The special assumptions
of Section II are mostly relaxed by the end of Section IV. Section IV
also recasts the rule in certainty equivalent form, restates it for
multifactor capital asset pricing or arbitrage pricing models, and
derives implications for the valuation of real options.
Section V sums up and notes certain implications of our
analysis for capital structure theory and the takeover business.
II. A DISCOUNTING RULE FOR RISKY ASSETS
Consider an asset generating a single cash flow X = E(X)
to be received next period. X is net of corporate taxes. However,
these taxes do not reflect any interest tax shields on debt
associated with, or supported by, X. In other words, the corporate
tax to be paid on the asset is calculated assuming all-equity
financing. This follows standard capital budgeting practice. We
assume that the firm has enough taxable income, from either the
asset being valued or from other assets, to realize interest tax
shields immediately upon payment of interest. We also ignore
transaction costs and other possible market imperfections.
We assume the standard capital asset pricing model. The
market portfolio is a convenient reference because it. is actively
traded and probably fairly priced. Its expected return should be
easier to estimate than expected returns on other equity portfolios
or specific common stocks.
Our risk measure is P. However, we make no specific
assumptions about the intercept and slope of the security market
line.
We now present two proofs. The proofs differ in assumptions
and approach. They are not just two different versions of the same
story. In the own-equity financing proof, the firm finances the
project through riskless borrowing and its own equity. The firm
sets the project's capital structure to equate the expected rates of
return on the project's equity and the market portfolio. This gives
the discount rate for cash flows to the project's equity. The
discount rate for overall project cash flows is then easily
calculated.
In the corporate opportunity cost proof, investment in the
project is traded off against investment in a mixture of the riskless
asset and the market portfolio. This mixture replicates the
project's expected cash flow and risk. The cost of this replicating
portfolio determines the value of the project to the firm.
Own-equity financing
Suppose the firm "finances" the project with D = (1-p)V dollars
of debt, where V is the yet-to-be-determined project value, and 3 is
its asset beta. In all cases the firm's equity claim on the project is
worth 3V. If P > 1, (1- p)V is negative, that is, the firm borrows
nothing and lends ( 1 - 1)V by investing in safe, short-term
marketable securities.
The initial market value balance sheet for the project is:
V = V(XD)
V
D = (1-P)V
E= pV
V
Note that V may depend on debt policy. We do not assume that
borrowing (1- P )V is the best policy, only that it is a feasible
policy. We do assume, provisionally, that the beta of V(X,D) does not
depend on D. 4
The next step pins down the "cost of debt." We assume that
debt is risk-free, so that the firm can, or could, borrow against this
project at the rate rf. This is an unusual assumption which we relax
later. However, in the absence of transaction or information costs,
risk-free borrowing is a close-to-feasible strategy. Remember that
X is realized after a short wait. If information about X arrives
continuously (no jumps in V) then debt secured by X is risk-free in
the limit as the wait shrinks to zero and debt levels are
continuously rebalanced. 5
This is consistent with the underlying assumptions of the
conventional weighted average cost of capital. As Miles and Ezzell
(1980) show, that approach implicitly assumes that debt and equity
claims are rebalanced each period to maintain a constant market-
value debt ratio.
The beta of the value-weighted portfolio of debt and equity
equals the asset beta. With risk-free debt (3D = 0),
3 = PD(DN) + P3E(E/V) = 03E (E/V) . (3)
Rearranging (3), and substituting D = (1-13)V and E = PV,
D 1-_
PE= P (1 +E)= P (1 + )=1 .
Since the equity beta equals one, rE = rm, the expected rate of return
on the market portfolio.
At the end of the period, the expected inflow equals the
expected after-tax cash flow from the project, X, plus the interest
tax shield, rfTcD. The expected outflow to equity is
pV(1 + rm) and the outflow to debt is (1 - p)V(1 + rf). We value the
project by equating the end-of-period expected inflows and
outflows.
X + rfTcD = D(1 + rf) + E(1 + rm). (4)
Substituting the financing policy, D = (1 - P) V and E = PV, and
rearranging provides:
X = V(1 + t'z (1 - 3) rf(1 - Tc) + prm) = V(1 + r*).
The value of the after-tax cash flow, V, is calculated as:
V = X/(1 + r*) (5)
In application, (5) is the starting point, not the end result. The
firm forecasts X, and discounts at r* to obtain V. Then it can issue
debt of (1- P)V. Our proof shows that the actual market value of X
(or of the debt plus the residual equity claim) is in fact V under the
assumed financing policy.6
If the firm chooses not to follow this strategy, our discounting
rule still works if such a financing strategy is feasible, or if there
is a feasible alternative financing strategy which yields the same
project value. In particular, suppose the firm chooses not to
rebalance continuously, so that debt issued to finance the project is
not riskless. This does not invalidate our proposition, because the
net present value (NPV) of issuing risky debt is the same as the NPV
of safe debt. Substituting the risky debt for the safe debt has NPV
of zero in perfect and efficient capital markets. Thus the value
obtained from using our rule is still correct. We discuss this
further below.
Corporate Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost of capital for a risky project can be
determined by constructing a portfolio that replicates the
expectation and risk of the project's after-tax cash flow. Since the
firm can invest in either the project or the replicating portfolio, the
expected return on the replicating portfolio is the appropriate
project hurdle rate.
Let rp be the expected after-tax rate of return on a portfolio of
securities with the same risk and expected after-tax cash return as
the project. The replicating portfolio is constructed by investing
(1-P)V in the riskless asset and PV in the market portfolio, where V
is the yet-to-be-determined project value. The expected payoff of
this replicating portfolio is:
V(1 + rp) = (1 - p) V (1 + rf(1-Tc)) + 3V(1 + rm). (6)
The first right-hand-side term of (6) assumes that the firm pays
taxes on riskless investments at the marginal tax rate, Tc; the
second right-hand-side term assumes the firm does not pay taxes on
investments in the market portfolio.
The risk of the replicating portfolio is also determined by its
covariance with the market portfolio.
Cov(V(1 + rr),rm)= VCov(p•'m,,m)= Vfom2 . (7)
Substituting the definition of the asset beta, p - Cov(X,rm) / Vo,2
into (7) shows that the project and the replicating portfolio have the
same covariance.
The after-tax cash flow has an expected payoff of X. We find
the investment V in the replicating portfolio which likewise offers
X
V(1 + - ( 1- Tc) +P3rn) = X (8)
Rearranging (8), r
V = X (1 + (1 - P) rf(1 - Tc) + p rm)
V = X/(1 + r*).
This completes the proof.
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The corporate opportunity cost proof could also be run in
reverse. The firm could sell (1 - P)V of the riskless asset and
short-sell 1V of the market portfolio. This effectively sells a
future cash flow X for immediate proceeds V.
If the firm can buy or sell X for the price V, then the value of
an equivalent-risk investment project generating X must also be V.
If the project can be taken on for less than V, it must have a
positive NPV.
The reversed corporate opportunity cost proof connects to the
own-equity financing proof. The firm could work through that
analysis and then actually issue debt secured by the project and a
residual equity claim. That claim would have P=1 and offer the same
return as the market portfolio. This financing package would also
be the replicating portfolio for the project.
Application to Long-Lived Assets
Moving from one to t-period discounting is easy once the t-
period financing policy is specified. Our discounting rule can be
applied period by period if debt is adjusted to the specified fraction
of market value at the start of each period.
We assume that an unlevered equity claim Xt can be properly
valued by discounting at a constant risk adjusted rate. That in turn
means that the ingredients of our discount rate (i.e., 3, rf, and rm) are
also constant,7 and that equation (1) generates the same r* for each
future period.
Think of how Vu, the value of an unlevered claim on Xt, is
determined at t-2. It is:
Et-2 ( . 1 ) E-2(Vt-12 (Xt/(1 +r)) Et-2 (Xt)
t-2 l+r 1 + r (1+r) 2
In other words, the unlevered value of Xt at t-2 is the expectation of
its uncertain value at t-1, which in turn is linked to the expectation
9 of Xt given information available at t-2.
The value Xt at t-1 under our assumed financing policy is
proportional to V -1
Et-1 ( Xt) 1l+r
V (1+r*) =Vt-1  +r
Given this proportional link, the "asset beta" of Vt-1 as viewed from
t - 2 is identical to the beta of Vu viewed from the same point.
We can therefore treat Vt-1 as if it were a cash payoff to
investment at t - 2. The cash payoff is discounted at r*.
This argument obviously repeats for t - 3, t - 4, etc. In
general:
Eo(Xt) Xt
Vo = =(1 +r*)t (l+r*)t
Tax shields and discount rates. So far we have assumed that
the risk of the total cash payout to debt and equity does not depend
on the debt amount. This is not always right, because the corporate
interest tax shield TcrfD is a safe nominal flow, received when
12
interest is paid next period. The overall beta of debt and equity is
thus reduced by borrowing whenever interest tax shields contribute
to firm value.8. If they do contribute, our rule could be modified by
putting more weight on rf(1-Tc), the after-tax risk-free rate, and
less on the market return rm. However, the modification makes
hardly any difference. Exact and approximate rates rarely differ by
more than half a percentage point.9 This difference easily fits in the
typical confidence band for a cost of capital estimate.
Tax shields and unlevered betas. Asset betas are often
calculated by unlevering observed equity betas. Several unlevering
formulas have been developed. We suggest10
Pu = PD D/V + PEE/V (9)
Where PD and PE are the betas of the firm's outstanding debt and
equity. Of course oD 0 if the firm follows our financing policy.
Equation (9) is almost exact when the firm rebalances its
capital structure to maintain a constant D/V at the start of each
period. Consider an MM world where firm value includes the full
value of interest tax shields. The dollar payoff to debt and equity
investors at t = 1 is X1 + V1 + rf TcDo. The market value balance
sheet is:
V
Interest tax shields received in t - 2 may increase V1, but the value
of these shields, viewed from t = 0, is strictly proportional to the
unlevered value of the firm. The only safe (zero-beta) cash flow is
next year's interest tax shield; its beta is zero.
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We want the asset beta, that is the beta of V(Xl + V1).
Equation (9) gives us a weighted average of the asset beta and the
beta of V(rf TcDo), i.e. zero. However, the present value of next
year's interest tax shield is a very small fraction of overall firm
value, and for practical purposes we can take pu as an estimate of 3.
Review of Assumptions
We now step back to review the assumptions supporting the
two proofs of our discounting rule.
Taxation of intercorporate investment. Managers who
calculate and use the weighted average cost of capital in practice
routinely make unrealistic assumptions. For example, they assume
that their firm will rebalance its capital structure to maintain a
constant market-value debt ratio. The only unusual unrealistic
assumption in the corporate opportunity cost proof is that the firm
pays no tax on investments in the market portfolio. The effective
tax rate on such investments -- call it TCM -- is less than Tc
because only 20 percent of intercorporate dividends are taxed.
However, TcM is clearly positive.
Of course a firm actually investing in equities would do what
it could to minimize TCM. For example, it could invest in a high-
dividend portfolio with P = 1. Even better, it could buy the market
via an overfunded pension plan, or take over another company,
adjusting leverage so that the target's 1 = 1. It could buy its own
shares -- our rule follows immediately if the firm's capital
structure is chosen to give 1E = 1. Finally the corporate opportunity
cost proof could be run in reverse, with the firm issuing an equity
claim with p = 1.
Nevertheless, just assuming TCM = 0 is not entirely plausible.
Fortunately, that assumption is not required in the own-equity
14
financing proof. Each proof's unusual assumption is not required by
the other.
Risk-free borrowing. The own-equity financing proof
assumes the firm could finance with default-risk-free debt.
Corporate debt would be (close to) risk-free if the firm committed
to frequent rebalancing to maintain a market-value debt ratio less
than one for the firm as a whole. This kind of rebalancing would
raise no eyebrows in other financial contexts, for example, hedging
strategies in options trading, or margin loans. Margin loans are
virtually risk-free so long as the shares serving as collateral are
actively traded and margin calls are promptly executed if the shares
fall. It does not matter how risky the shares are so long as price
discontinuities are ruled out.
However, corporations do not rebalance frequently and
consistently. Therefore corporate lenders are exposed to default.
We think of the firm as implementing a two-step strategy:
1. Buy an asset, issuing new debt of (1-P)V. The debt is
rebalanced at short intervals and therefore is close to risk-
free.
2. Buy back the risk-free debt with a longer-term debt issue
which is not rebalanced and therefore may default.
Step 2 is clearly zero-NPV in a taxless, frictionless world. If it is
actually close to zero-NPV, then we can analyze capital investments
as if financing were as assumed in the own-equity financing proof.
The real issue, then, is whether taxes or market imperfections
make step 2's NPV positive or negative. We return to this point in
Section IV.
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Possible tax gains from levering up. The own-equity financing
proof values projects correctly under any equilibrium theory of debt
and taxes, so long as the corporation adheres to a specific financing
policy for the project. We do not claim that this financing policy is
optimal, only that it is feasible. If there is a different optimal
policy, and if the manager knows what that policy is, extra value can
be generated.
In general, using more debt than (1-13)V increases the value of
the firm if there are significant tax advantages to corporate debt.
We emphasize that additional leverage may increase the value of the
firm -- not the value of the project -- because the firm can obtain
these advantages without the project. The firm could simply buy the
replicating portfolio (or some other company) instead of the project
and lever it up. Possible benefits from using more debt than in our
financing strategy accrue to the tax status of the firm, not to the
project, to the extent that the firm can buy common stocks tax-free.
Suppose a proposed investment offers a negative NPV at our
discount rate r*. Could investment ever be justified by levering up
the project? Only if two conditions hold. First, the firm must
already have reached the "debt capacity" of its other assets --
otherwise the firm could borrow more without taking the immediate
project. Second, investment by the firm in the market portfolio or
other equities must be closed off, taxed, or more costly than direct
investment by the firm's shareholders. If the firm can earn r* on a
replicating portfolio, there is no reason to take less from the
project.
Asset pricing. Our two proofs are not based on arbitrage. Both
the replication and self-financing approaches require a capital asset
pricing model to identify the priced characteristics of the project.
The proofs match parameters -- expected return and covariance --
not realized cash flow. There is always residual risk to be absorbed
or hedged by the firm and its shareholders. However, this residual
16
risk is unpriced, because it is diversifiable and investors do not
demand a premium for bearing it.
Iii. Net Corporate Tax Advantages to Debt Financing
Our proposition and its two proofs focus on corporate taxes
and rely on the market prices of securities to fully incorporate
personal taxes. We now show why our valuation approach works
under various theories of debt and taxes as long as the firm adheres
to the debt policy that underlies our discounting rule.
Define Tpe and Tpd as the marginal investor's personal tax rates
on equity and interest income, respectively. Also, define rfe as the
expected rate of return on zero-beta equity. If the personal tax
rates on equity and interest income are equal, as in Modigliani and
Miller (1963), then rfe equals the riskless rate, rf. In general, the
after-personal-tax rates on safe debt and zero beta equity must be
the same in equilibrium:
rfe(1-Tpe) = rf(1 - Tpd). (10)
Thus in Miller's (1977) model, where the personal tax rate on equity
income is zero and the marginal investor's personal tax rate on debt
equals the corporate rate, the expected return on zero beta equity
equals the after-corporate-tax riskless rate: rfe = rf(1 - Tc).
We do not know the expected return on zero-beta equity or the
personal tax rates of the relevant marginal investor. We assume the
firm knows the market-wide rates of return, rf and rm, but not rfe.
The security market line for equities is r = rfe + P(rm - rfe ), but the
intercept and slope of the security market line are unknown.
Figure 1 shows three possible security market lines: first, the
"MM" line with rfe = rf, which matches the original capital asset
pricing model; second, the "Miller line" with
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Tpe = 0 and rfe = rf (1-Tc), and finally an intermediate case. The MM
line implies a strong tax advantage to corporate borrowing, the
intermediate line a weaker advantage, and the Miller line no
advantage at all. We do not know which line is right. But the value
of a future cash flow does not depend on the model so long as the
firm adheres to the debt policy underlying our discounting rule.
Define T* as the net corporate tax gain from one dollar of
interest payments, including the effect of personal taxes. Suppose
the firm issues debt paying one dollar of interest per year, using the
debt proceeds to retire equity. The corporate tax shield is Tc, or
Tc(1-Tpe) after equity investors' taxes. The switch to debt also
subjects one dollar of interest income to personal tax at Tpd rather
than Tpe, at a cost to investors of Tpd - Tpe. The net gain after all
taxes is Tc(1-Tpe) - Tpe + Tpd. Divide by 1-Tpe to express this as a
before-personal-tax amount. 11
(Tpd- Tpe)(T* = Tc- 1 - Tpe (11)
The obvious cases are "MM", where Tpd = Tpe= 0 so that T* = Tc, and
"Miller" with Tpe = 0, and Tpd = Tc, so that T* = 0.
Given some security market line, and thus some discount rate r
for an unlevered equity claim on X, market value can be calculated
using the adjusted present value (APV) approach. V is the sum of a
pure equity claim on X plus the value of the interest tax shields:12
X T*rf(1 - )V (12)
1 + r 1+ r
where (1 - p)V is the debt issued against X; r is the discount rate for
an all-equity claim to the cash flow; and T*rf(1 - P)V is the net
interest tax shield after personal as well as corporate taxes.
Rearranging,
18
XV = 1+ r - T*r(1 - ) (13)
Thus the APV formulation implicitly discounts the risky after-tax
cash flow at r - T*rf(1 - P13). We can now check whether this implicit
discount rate always equals our r*.
Compare our rule with the CAPM expression for r, the all-
equity opportunity cost of capital.
r* rf(1-Tc)(1-13) + 1rm
r = rfe + P(rm - rfe) = rfe (1-1) + prm
(Discounting rule)
(CAPM)
Subtract the second from the first equation and express
r* as:
= r - (1 - 13)(rfe - rf(1-Tc)) (14)
From (10), rfe = rf(1-Tpd)/(1-Tpe). Substitute for rfe in (14) and
simplify:
r * = r- (1 - 13) rf ( 1-Tpe - 1 +Tc)
r-(1 - 13) rf (Tc- 1pd - Tpe1 - Tp e
= r - (1 - 13)rf T*.
This proves that our discounting rule will work without specifying
personal tax rates as long as the firm adheres to a financing policy
of D = (1-13)V.
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Examole
Suppose we observe rf = .10 and rm = .20. The corporate tax
rate is Tc = .5. The cash flow's expected value is X = 100 and its
beta is .5. Our discounting rule gives r* = (1 - .5) (.10) (1 - .5)
+ (.5) (.20) = .125 and a value V = 100/1.125 = 88.89.
Table 1 shows that exactly the same value is obtained under
three different assumptions about debt, taxes and the security
market line. The calculations in Table 1 clarify why our discounting
rule works under any equilibrium model of debt and taxes. If we
move from Case 1 (MM) to Case 2 (Miller), the expected cash flow X
loses value because T* drops from .50 to zero. But it also gains
value because the all-equity opportunity cost of capital, r, falls
from 15 to 12.5 percent. The loss and gain exactly offset. Given rf,
rm and Tc, and given our proposed financing policy, calculated value
can never be increased by assuming a higher value for T* because a
consistent assumption about the security market line requires
increasing r to offset the tax gain.
IV. Extensions
Certainty Equivalents
We know that certain cash flows should be discounted at the
after-tax risk-free rate, rf(1-Tc). Our discounting rule gives the
same rate for uncertain cash flows in the special case of P = 0. We
now show that the certainty equivalent of a positive-beta cash flow
should also be discounted at rf(1-Tc).
Note first that the conventional discounting formula
V = X/(l+r*), where r* = (1-P)rf (1-Tc) + prm, is algebraically
identical to the certainty equivalent valuation model
X - Xcov(X,rm)
V 1 + ( T1 + rf(1 -Tc)
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where the certainty equivalent cash flow is CEQ = X - X cov (X,rm),
rm - rf (1 - Tc)
and X =
Gm 2
This result can also be obtained from Black's (1988)
discounting rule. Black assumes the cash flow X can be expressed as
a linear function of the return on the market, X = a + bFm + e. The
error term e is diversifiable noise, and so we ignore it. Note that
a + bFm = a - b + b(l+?'m). The present value of b(l+r'm), the payoff
to b dollars invested in the market, is simply b; (a - b) is a fixed
cash flow which must be discounted at the after-tax risk-free rate.
Therefore
a-b a + brf(1-Tc)
(X) +rf(-Tc) 1+rf(1-Tc)
The certainty equivalent, CEQ = a + brf(1-Tc), is the expectation of X
conditional on rm = rf(1-Tc).
This result does not assume or imply that rfe, the unconditional
expected return on a zero-beta stock, equals rt(1-Tc); rfe, whatever
it is, never enters the certainty equivalent valuation. 13
Consider the following certainty equivalent version of our
own-equity financing proof. Note that the beta of (a + b) is zero; the
beta of b(l+rm) is by definition one. Then
p V = V(a+b) x 0 + V(b(1 + rm)) x 1 = b
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The implied balance sheet is:
V = V(X,D) D = (1-P3)V = V - b
E = pV= b
The cash returns on each side are equal regardless of the outcome
r m:
a + brm + Tcrt(V - b) = (1 + rf)(V - b) + b(1 + 7m)
The final term b(1 + 7m) is the cash return to equity. Thus the cash
return to debt is
a + bF'm + Tcrf(V - b) - b(1+rm) = (1 + rf)(V - b). (18)
Solving for V,
a + brf(1-Tc)
1+rf(1-Tc)
The certainty equivalent version of the corporate opportunity
cost proof is also interesting. If equity investments by corporations
are untaxed, the firm can obtain X = a + b7m by the following
strategy.
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Cost Payoff
a - b a-b
Lend: 1+ rf(1-Tc)
Invest: b b(1 + 7rm)
Totals: a + brf(1 -Tc) a + bfm
1 +rf(1 -Tc)
The value of a + brm must equal the cost of replicating it. This cost
is found by discounting at the after-tax risk-free rate.
Valuing corporate options
Standard option valuation techniques "discount" at the risk-
free interest rate. For corporations, the appropriate risk-free rate
is after-tax. Ruback (1986) showed that the time value of money for
a tax-paying firm is rf(l-Tc). This rate should be used to value real
options held by corporations.
Suppose we discount X at our r* to obtain a value V(X). The
implicit equity claim is E = PV(X) with PE = 1. We can value a call on
X by considering a portfolio of the call option plus lending which
locally replicates the returns to the equity position in the
underlying asset. This determines the value of the option to the
corporation. This value is the same as obtained by valuing the option
directly, using rf(1-Tc) as the risk-free interest rate. Of course the
cash inflows and outflows associated with the real option all have
to be defined after corporate tax.
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Example. Consider an asset with 3 = .5 and r* = .125 as in
Table 1. The payoff is binomial, either 150 or 75, with X = 112.5 and
V = 100. The implicit debt and equity claims are D = E = 50. The
after-tax interest rate is .05. Now consider a call on X at an
exercise price of S = 100. The payoffs are:
Asset Equity Call (Max X-S,0)
150 - 52.50 = 97.50
75 - 52.50 = 22.50
150 - 100 = 50
0
Replicate the equity by purchasing Nc calls and borrowing. The sum
of principal and after-tax interest is B. Replication requires 50Nc +
B = 97.50 and OxNc + B = 22.50. Thus Nc = 1.5.
The implied balance sheet is:
1.5 calls = 28.57
Debt = 21.43
50
E = 50
50
Debt is B/(1+rf(1-Tc)) = 22.50/1.05 = 21.43. Since 1.5 calls plus
21.43 must equal 50 (the value of the replicated equity claim), the
value of one call is 19.05.
We can also value the call by first assuming the expected
payoff to the assets is the risk-free rate, and then discounting the
resulting expected payoff to the call. This requires "up" and "down"
probabilities of .4 and .6, so that .4(150) + .6(75) = 105. The present
value of the call is
= 150
X= 75
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Call Value = E[Max(X- S,) .4(50) 19.051+rf(1-Tc) 1.05
Default risk and taxes
We now return to the own-equity financing proof's assumption
of risk-free borrowing. This requires frequent rebalancing: in
particular, the firm has to invest additional equity, and pay down
debt, every time project value falls.
Suppose instead that non-recourse debt is issued against a
project. The firm does not rescue bad outcomes with additional
equity, and so acquires a default put. The cost of this put shows up
as a reduction in the amount that can be borrowed against a given
promised payment to lenders. If the default put is worth P, the
implied project balance sheet is:
V (X)
V
D = (1-P)V -P
E = pV + P
V
The firm "purchases" the default put worth P by investing that much
more in the project. Lenders give up the put but invest P dollars
less. In a perfect and efficient capital market, this transaction is
clearly zero-NPV. Therefore we can ignore default and analyze
project value as if only risk-free debt were issued.
Straightforward taxes do not disturb this argument, even if
tax rates differ on the two sides of the put transaction. The put can
be valued by (1) assuming that the underlying asset V(X) offers an
expected rate of return of rf(1-Tc), (2) calculating the expected
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payoff to the put in the world assumed in step (1), and (3)
discounting at rf(1-Tc). Let the expected pre-tax payoff to the put
in step (2) be Y. If the cost of the put (P) is tax-deductable, the
after tax payoff is Y(1-Tc) + TcP. The put's value is
Y(1-Tc)+ TcP Y
1+ rf(1-Tc) 1+rf (19)
In other words, taxes wash out of the option valuation. If purchase
of the put is zero-NPV after-tax, it is zero-NPV pretax, and
conversely.
It would be rash to claim that taxes always wash out of the
valuation of default puts. The intricacy of actual tax codes may hide
features which in effect subsidize firms which issue risky rather
than safe debt. However, we find no such subsidies in the obvious
cases. A further discussion of these cases is given in the Appendix.
Multifactor Arbitrage Pricing Models
Our analysis can be extended to an environment in which asset
prices are a linear function of more than one factor. Take Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT) as an example. Under APT, the expected return
on an equity security, r, equals:
r = rfe + P1 (rl - rfe) + P2 (r2 - rfe) + ...-- + Pk (rK - rfe), (20)
where rfe is the return on riskless equities, r1 through rK are the
expected returns to factors 1 thorough k, and P1 through Pk are the
asset betas for the respective factors. Imagine forming a composite
portfolio in which the factors are weighted in proportion to the
asset betas. The expected return of this portfolio, rp, is
rp = (31/B) ri + (32/B) r2 +(Pk/B) rk (21)
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where B pi + P2 + ... + 3k.
All our analysis can simply be repeated substituting rp for rm.
In an APT environment, the discounting rule becomes:
r* = (1-B) rf (1-Tc) + B rp. (22)
The APT version of our discounting rule is more difficult to
apply than the CAPM version. The APT requires the identification of
multiple factors and estimation of expected returns and betas for
each identified factor. Furthermore, the composite portfolio will
change from project to project as the underlying asset betas change.
In principle, however, our arguments follow through exactly for the
APT, as they do for any linear capital asset pricing model.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a rule for calculating discount rates for
risky projects. The rule works for any linear capital asset pricing
model. It works for any equilibrium theory of debt and taxes. It
works because it treats all projects as combinations of two assets:
Treasury bills and the market portfolio. We know how to value each
of these assets under any assumption about the slope and intercept
of the market line for equities.
Generality on these dimensions requires one of two special
assumptions. The analyst can assume either (1) that project
financing is arranged to keep the sum of business and financial risk
constant, so that equity claims on projects match the risk of some
reference portfolio of equities; or (2) that the firm can buy or sell
that reference portfolio without incurring corporate taxes. The
obvious (but not the only) reference portfolio is the market, which
requires that the implicit risk of project equity be PE = 1.
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Each of these assumptions could be questioned. For example, if
there are significant net tax gains to corporate borrowing, and if
firms cannot buy (sell) equities without paying (saving) significant
taxes, then firms could generate additional value by levering up each
project so that 0E > 1. If such opportunities exist, and firms
systematically pursue them, then correct project discount rates are
less than ours. Even in this case, however, our rule would be helpful
in establishing an upper bound for the correct discount rate and a
lower bound for project value.
Our rule values projects as if security markets conformed to a
Miller equilibrium in which there is no net tax advantage to
borrowing and the intercept of the security market line is the after-
tax Treasury rate. However, our discount rate does not change in
other possible equilibria, because the security market line shifts to
offset any net tax advantage to corporate debt.
Thus managers confronting capital investment decisions do not
have to profess their faith in any theory of taxes and capital
structure; we and they can stay agnostic.
However, we can not help observing that if value-maximizing
corporations are given tax-free access to equity markets, then it's
difficult to see how interest tax shields could have significant value
in the long run. Suppose equities were priced by the traditional
capital asset pricing model (the CAPM which says r = rf+ P(rm-rf)),
which gives a strong tax value to corporate debt. This would allow
corporations to make easy money. That CAPM says that all stocks
with p < 1 offer expected rates of return- higher than the hurdle rate
established by our rule. A firm could buy any one of those stocks,
financing the purchase with 100x(1-p) percent debt, and earn the
spread between the CAPM's r and our r*. (Buying up all the shares of
companies with low-beta stocks -- i.e., taking them over, would be
even better.) This would continue until low-beta stock prices were
bid up enough to drive r and r* together. The end result would be a
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Miller equilibrium, in which the security market line and the
equation for our discounting rule exactly correspond.
Tmble 1
Calculating the Adjusted Prusent Value under
different theories about debt and taxs
The example assumes an expected cash flow after one period, X, of $100; an asset beta, p, of 5; a Treasury Bill rate of 10%; and an expected market return of 20%The value of the project ung the general discounting rule with r* - (1 - p) r, (1 - Tc) + Pr. is:
V X 100 88.891 + r" 1.125
PARAHETE VALUES
MIT CORPORATE CAiN P_ DOLLAR INTERUSTs
T* - TC - I(Tpd - Tpe)/(l - Tp))
I~PECTID XRTURJ 01N ZEkO-BITA ErQUITT
r - rf ((1 - Tpd)I(l - Tpe)
ALL-EQUITT COST OF CAPITALe
r - rgf + p(r. - rf,)
ADJUSTGD PIISINT VALUE OF TRE PROJECTo
I + TC(1 - p)APV
APV-
1 4
I CAPfITAL STOCTUE ITHEN!
1I1 (Modigliani and Miller, 1963)
Tpd - Tpe
TC - 0
T* - 501
rfe- 101
r - 151
100 * .2778(.1)(1 - .5)APV
AVP -
1.15
- 88.89
Miller, 1977
Tpd TC  501
Tp- 0
T* - 0
rff - 51
r 12.52
100 + 0(.10)(1 - .5)APV
APV-
1.125
- 88.69
Tpe - 101
Td - 301
TC - 502
T* - 27.781
rfe - 7.78Z
r - 13.892
100 + .2778(.1)(1 - .S)APV
APV -
1.1369
--- --
--
Intermediate
r
m
rf
rf (1-T)
r
:d
:laim
.5
Figure 1
Security market lines implied by three theories of
debt and taxes. For each case th. intercept, rfe
, 
is
given by rfe (1-Tpe) w rf (-Tpd ).
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APPENDIX: DEFAULT RISK AND TAXES
One proof of our discounting rule assumes that default-risk
free debt can be issued against the assets being valued. We argue
that substituting risky for safe debt is a zero-NPV transaction, so
that our rule works when there is default risk. The following
examples illustrate the argument.
Think of the project as a "sub" of a corporate parent that will
pay tax. The parent may choose whether to stand behind the sub's
debt. The sub may be taxed stand-alone, or its profits and losses
may be passed up to its parent.
The following numerical example is set up so that NPV = 0 in
case 1, when the sub is taxed as part of the firm and does not
borrow separately (the firm could borrow according to our rule).
Then we show that NPV is unchanged if the sub issues debt which
may default.
Example
The sub lasts only one period. It faces 50-50 probabilities of good
and bad states. Suppose it invests 100 now. At period 1,
Good state
Pre-tax cash flow
less depreciation
EBIT
Tax
Net income
plus depreciation
Cash flow
140
-100
40
-20
20
120
Note that with stand-alone tax the
the assets of the firm.
Bad state,
consolidated
tax
80
-100
-20
+10
-10
10090
Bad state.
stand-alone tax
80
80
government has a call option on
The following examples assume 3 = 0, D/V = 1.0, Tc = .50, rf = .10,
and r* = rf(1-Tc) = .05. By our valuation rule V = 100 with
consolidated tax:
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120
105V = 05= 100, D = 100 at 10%1.05 - 100
NPV = V -100 = 0
90
Suppose the sub's debt is issued with recourse to the parent. The
equity returns are
120 - 110 + 5 = +15
E=0
90 - 110 + 5 = -15
Put in 20 to Interest
pay off debt tax shield of 5
Now assume the sub issues non-recourse debt with a promised
payoff of 110. The sub will default in the bad state. We consider
this case for two tax regimes: in the first, the sub and parent are
consolidated for tax purposes, even in default; in the second, the sub
is taxed as a separate corporation.
Non-recourse debt. consolidated tax. Hold the promised
payment to debt at 110. Assume that debt gets only 80 in the bad
state because the parent keeps the depreciation tax shield. (The end
result of NPV = 0 for equity is actually independent of the payoff to
debt in the bad state. Any default put that's fair to debt investors
has zero NPV to equity.)
The debt will be sold for:
110
80
95
D = = 86.361.1
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The equity returns will be:
120 - 110 + .5(23.64) Interest tax shield
allows firm to write
off cost of put.
0 + 10 - .5(6.36) Depreciation tax
shield of 10; tax paid
on gain from paying
off 86.36 of debt at
80.
Compare these payoffs to those in case 1. The default put gives:
+.5(13.64)
+25 - .5(6.36)
14.32NPV = =4 13.641.05
But the put cost 13.64 because the parent had to put up that much
more equity to start with. Thus the put has zero NPV. We can value
the sub as if the parent collateralized its debt.
Non-recourse debt, stand-alone tax. Here the sub is set up
entirely on its own bottom. It issues debt of 86.36 against the
promised payment of 110. The debt payoffs are
110
80
95
V = = 86.361.1
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Thus the parent again has to put in 13.64 of equity.
equity are:
120 - 110 + .5(23.64)
0 + .5(13.64)
The payoffs to
Interest tax
shield used by
sub.
Write off of
equity
investment is
tax-deduction
for parent.
Equity value is
.5(10 + .5(23.64)) + .5(5(13.64))
1.05 = 13.64,
and the NPV of equity investment is again zero.
Conclusion
The own-equity financing proof does not require default-risk free
debt. Substituting default-exposed debt for default-protected debt
is a zero-NPV transaction. Thus projects or subs can be valued as if
they were financed with default-risk free debt issued at the
Treasury rate rf.
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*This paper is a substantially expanded and generalized
treatment of ideas first expressed in Myers and Ruback (1988). We
thank Carliss Baldwin, Dick Brealey, Mervyn King, Lawrence Kolbe,
James Miles, Bruno Solnik, and Jim Wiggins for helpful comments.
We also thank MIT's Center for Energy Policy Research, the London
Business School and the Harvard Business School for research
support.
1. Franks and Hodges (1978) first used this argument to value
financial leases.
2. The corresponding real r* is calculated as (1 + r*)/(1 + i) - 1,
where i is the expected inflation rate.
3. The adjusted present value (APV) rules developed by Myers (1974)
also require knowledge of (or an assumption about) marginal
personal tax rates on debt and equity income. See Taggart (1991),
Exhibit Ill.
4. The beta actually declines with D when interest tax shields add to
firm value. See fn. 8 below. However, the error introduced by
assuming dp/dV = 0 is trivial for long-lived assets when capital
structure is rebalanced period by period. We show this below.
When D is continuously rebalanced, the 0 of V(X,D) is totally
disconnected from D. Debt tax shields may make dV/(dD>0, but the
value of those tax shields will be strictly proportional to V(X,0) and
therefore have the same beta as a pure equity claim on X.
5. This does not follow when P= 0 and D = V unless X is known with
absolute certainty. However, our assumed financing policy is still
feasible if debt capacity can be poached from other positive-beta
assets. Poaching is costless, since with continuously adjusted
financing more debt can be issued against other assets without
risking default.
6. Our rule implies D = V and r* = (1-Tc)rf when P = 0. Perhaps this
case requires further discussion. Note X = V(1 + r* + e) where e is a
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diversifiable "error" with zero mean. If D = V, then the equity claim
receives only ', which must have NPV = 0. Thus V = D =
X/(1 + r*).
Here is a consistency check. Suppose we are right that
Vo = Xo/(l+rf(1-Tc)) -- here the subscript refers to "zero beta."
Take another asset with value V1 (for simplicity assume Vi = Vo)
and P=1. Now value the portfolio of Vo and V1, which has 3 = 1/2.
Xo + X1
V(Xo+X1) = 1 + rf(1 -Tc) (1 - 0/2) + (P/2)rm
Now check that Vo = V(Xo + X1) - Vi = Xo/(1 + rf(l - Tc)). It does.
This is also a useful way of thinking about negative-beta
assets. Suppose 3 = -.5 and V = X/(l+r*)=100, and that the firm
holds the asset plus 50 in the market (M) or some other asset with
P = 1. The project balance sheet in this case is
V =100
M = 50
150
D =150
E= 0
150
The firm borrows 150 and holds assets with an overall beta of zero.
The return rmM is used to pay part of the debt interest, so the net
"cost of financing" is -
100 (1 + rf(1 - Tc) 1.5 - .5rm),
which just offsets the expected payoff X = V(1+r*). In this case
equity investors hold no net investment, and receive a payoff with
zero mean, zero beta, and thus zero value. Of course if the asset can
be purchased for less than 100, that NPV is cash in the bank.
7. Three conditions are usually considered necessary for discounting
a cas ow 
at a constant 
n
h fl 
i k d 
t d t 
1 k 
t t
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beta for an all-equity claim on the cash flow, (2) a known, constant
market risk premium, (3) a known, constant Treasury bill rate.
Condition (1) implies that uncertainty is resolved at a
constant rate over time. It also implies that the detrended stream
of project cash flows would follow a multiplicative random walk.
("Detrended" cash flows are expressed as percentages of their ex
ante expectations.) see Myers and Turnbull (1977) and Fama (1977).
8. If they do not contribute, the overall beta is unchanged by
borrowing despite the addition of the safe interest tax shields.
Consider the beta of investing in the total cash payout to debt and
equity investors. It depends on the covariance of the return on this
investment with the market return Fm, that is:
COV[(X +rfTcD)/V,rm] = COV(X,rm)/V.
The safe tax shield rfTcD affects this covariance only as it affects
V.
9. Suppose the interest tax shield adds yD to the value of the firm,
and that the firm increases borrowing by this amount. The market
value balance sheet is:
V- yD
yD
V = V(X,D)
D = (1 - p) (V - yD) + yD
E
V
The debt and equity weights work out to (1 - 3)/(1 - 3y) and
1(1 - y)/(1 - 3y) respectively. The revised discount rate is:
1 - 13(1 - y)
r*= ( )rf(l - Tc) + rm (10)
1-py 1- Py
1E, the beta of the equity claim, is again one despite the addition of
the safe asset yD to the left-hand side of the balance sheet. The
36
rest of the proofs follow as before. For example, under the
assumptions of Table 1 below,
TCrf1 .5(.10)y=f .0476Y 1+rf(1-Tc) - 1 + .10(1-.5) -
The weight on the after-tax risk free rate would change from
1 - 1 = .5 to:
(1- p) .5
= .512.1 - P3y 1-.5(.0476)
The discount rate changes by only 20 basis points, from r* = .125 in
Table 1 to:
r* = .512 (.10)(1-.5) + .488 (.20) = .123.
10. The "MM" unlevering formula is more common:
3u = (1-Tc) PD DN + PE EN
However, this assumes perpetual debt, no rebalancing, and the
maximum possible tax gain to leverage. We believe the assumption
of period-by-period rebalancing implicit in equations .(1) and (2) is
more reasonable.
11. Taggart (1991) expresses the value of interest tax shields as
GL = 1 - (1-Tc)(1-Tpe)1 
-Tp
where GL is the tax gain to leverage. Obviously this does not match
T* in (11). However, his APV formula multiplies GL by rfe, the
expected return on risk-free equity; in (12) below we multiply T* bythe interest rate on risk-free debt. His and our formulas give
exactly the same final values.
12. The interest tax shield is a safe, nominal cash inflow. Strictly
speaking, it should be discounted at a risk-free interest rate, not r,
the opportunity cost of capital for an all-equity financed project.
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Discounting both terms of (12) at r eliminates algebraic clutter
that's unrelated to the main point of this section. Moreover, in
practice discounting both terms at r is an excellent approximation,
since tax shields are known only for the first period. (See Taggart
(1991), p. 17) After that, capital structure is rebalanced, and tax
shields become just as risky as the project itself. With continuous
discounting and rebalancing, (12) is exact for cash flows received at
any future time.
13. There is a certainty-equivalent version of our discounting rule in
which rfe appears. Rewrite (18) below with rm = rfe:
a + brfe + Tcrf(V - b) = (1 + rf)(V - b) + b(1 + rfe)
This equates cash returns conditional on rm = rfe. Since V - b =
(1 -3) V and b = pV,
a + brfeV= 1+ rf*
rf* = rf(1 - Tc) (1 - p) + rf e
Thus rfe, if known, could replace rm in a discounting rule for
CEQs. In this case the expectation of X would have to be conditional
on rm = rfe.
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